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Introduction
I
OW-INCOME farms and farmers are commonly included in the agri-
I
cultural picture when advocates of government intervention in the
L agricultural economy state their case. The inclusion of low-income
farms, of course, has the effect of worsening the agricultural income
picture and thus strengthening the case.
The picture of the plight of agriculture, when used to advocate
government intervention, is commonly painted in one or more of three
colors: (1) some type of relationship of the prices of farm commodities
to prices of all commodities; (2) the dollar value of total agricultural
production; and (3) some average income per farm, such as cash market-
ings per farm, operators net income per farm, etc.
The literature is replete with the agricultural picture painted in
these three colors. A few quotations will serve to illustrate it. Murray
Benedict says:
By the fall of 1920 the short post-war boom in farm commodity and land
prices had passed its peak, and the prices of farm products were skidding
downward at a rate that was even faster than the spectacular rate of increase
in 1916, 1917, and 1918. Agricultural prices reached their highest level in
July, 1919 (246 per cent of the 1913 base) approximately a year before the
highest point of the all commodity index was reached (272 in May 1920).
Food prices to the consumer continued to climb for some time after prices at
the farm had begun to fall. Their maximum, like that for all commodities,
was reached in May 1920 at an index of 287. Cloth and clothing reached their
peak in February and March 1920 (at 356) and house furnishings in Septem-
ber and October (at 371). Lumber and metals which had remained at lower
levels during the war years moved up rapidly, lumber reaching a top of 341
in April and May 1920 and metals a high point of 195 in April.
Thus, by the spring of 1921, American agriculture found itself in a more
unfavorable position than it had experienced at any time in the memory of
men then living or possibly at any time since the nation's beginning.
The purchasing power of farm products ni terms of non-agricultural products
was down to 63 per cent as compared to prewar.
By the winter of 1921 farmers in the Dakotas and Nebraska were burning
corn for fuel and trading wool for needed socks and shirts. The clamor for
relief took on new forms and greater intensity. It was in this .setting that the
I
newlv fonned American Farm Bureau Federation began its campaign for farm
legislation. The Grange and Farmers Union took on new life, and various
radical farm organizations gained new strength.
As a result, the succeeding decade was to see a marked change in the legis-
lative activities of farm organizations and in farmer attitude concerning the
role of government in agricultural affairs.
i
The picture of the plight of; the farmer is here painted in the color
of the relation of farm prices, an average, to prices of all commodities,
another average. Any worsening in this relationship is a signal for
stepped-up government intervention.
In discussing the gradual recovery in farm areas during the 1920'
Benedict says:
The gap between farm and non-farm prices as measured by prewar relation-
ships was narrowing. Whereas in 1921 farm products had a purchasing power
of only 84 as compared with 100 in 1910-14, this ratio by 1928 had risen to 94.
Thus, farm products though still not up to the 1910-14 relationship with
other prices were not so severely depressed as the pressure for fann relief
implied. The farm relief dri\e of 1928 and early 1929 was more an after
effect of earlier depression years than a response to current conditions.2'
In a footnote Benedict uses another color to paint the picture,
namely an average farai income.
This gradual improvement stated in terms of changes in average income is
shown in the following figures taken from the Bureau of Agricultural Ec-
onomics publication, "The Farm Income Situation,' July-September 1951,
page 20.'
Cash Receipts from Farm Operator's Net Income











In his book Schultz says:
Despite its many ingredients, most of the farm problem boils down to issues
affecting the level of farm income. Most farm people find themselves in the
nation's lowest income brackets. In 1929 the income per person on farms
from farming was $233, and the income of those not on farms was $870; in
1932 these figures were $74 and $442, respectively; in 1937 they were $197 and
$671, and in the war year 1942 they climbed to' $389 and $1,023.4
^Murray Benedict. Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950. The Twentieth
Century Fund, New York, 1953, p. 151.
-Ibid., p. 231.
^Ibid., p. 231.
^Theodore W. Schultz, Agriculture in an UnstaMe Economy. Committee for Economic
Development. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London, 1945, p. 209.
Schultz also states:
The general low level of fami income is the backdrop against which policies
concerned with the instability of fann income must be projected.s
Another illustration of how the agricultural situation is commonly
measured is found in the following quotation:
Farm recovery requires, in short, that producers' prices shall rise more than
consumers' prices, in other words, that spreads between country and city
prices shall be reduced. These spreads are generally wider now than they
were before 1929, and universally wider than before the war.«
Chester C. Davis used all three colors to paint the agricultural pic-
ture which he says forced further intervention of the government into
agriculture:
Renewed depression fell, with cruel force on the American farmer. Even
at the peak of the business cycle in 1929, farm products could be exchanged
for only 91 per cent as much of other products, on the average, as they could
have been exchanged for in the period before the war. By February 1933,
the exchange value of farm products for industrial goods had fallen to 50
per cent of the prewar average. The value in terms of taxes and interest
was even less . . . Gross farm income from the production of 1932 was less
than half that of 1929 . . . The Department of Agriculture estimated that the
average farmer, after paying the expenses of production, rent, interest and
taxes had only about $230 left out of his year's income."
In picturing the improvement in the agricultural situation between
1939 and 1945, Benedict says:
Between 1939 and 1945, total national income rose from $71.5 billion to $164
billion, an advance of 129 per cent. Income from farming during the same
period increased from $5.25 billion to approximately $14 billion or about
165 per cent.*
I
In his message to Congress on November 1, 1943 in which the ob-
jectives of the food program were outlined, President Roosevelt stated:
The average income per farmer since the outbreak of the war in 1939 has
risen more than the average income of the other parts of the population.
This was also true between 1910 and 1914 which is the primary base period
for parity calculation. In 1942, the increase in the average income per farmer
over the parity base period was 38 per cent gieater than the increase in the
average income of the other people in the country. In 1943, it was 50 per cent
greater.'
The inclusion of low-income farms and farmers in the agricultural
picture continues in the present. It is not difficult to find evidence to
this effect. At a Conference on Problems and Policies of American
Agriculture sponsored by the Center for Agricultural Adjustment, Iowa
State College, October 27-31, 1958, Johnson and Bachman said:
''Ibid, p. 211.
^Yearbook of Agriculture, 1934, U. S. Department of Agriculture, p. 18.
'Chester C. Davis, "Development of Agricultural Policy Since World War I," Year-
hook of Agriculture, 1940, U. S. Department of Agriculture, p. 31.3.
^Benedict, op. cit., p. 452.
^Franklin D. Roosevelt PuMic Papers and Addresses, 1943. Harper & Bros., New York,
1950, pp. 482-483.
Public concern with respect to agriculture stems chiefly from the fact that
in recent years farm earnings have failed to keep pace with earnings in other
sectors of the economy. For example the index of "real income" for farm
workers in terms of 1947-49 dollars declined from 96 in 1950-51 to 84 in 1957.
At the same time real income of industrial workers increased from 110
to 129.10
At this same conference Timmons said:
Farm income, both aggregate and per capita has been lagging behind the
growth of the National economy and the non-farm segment. Because many
people hold this situation to be extremely undesirable, a generalized objective
of agricultural adjustment becomes one of finding ways whereby farm people
may earn incomes comparable to incomes received by workers in non-farm
eniployraent.il
Both the Republican and Democratic parties darken the pictme for
agriculture by including low-income farmers in it. The Republican
Party platform says:
Americans are the best fed and best clothed people in the World. Our chal-
lenge fortunately is one of dealing with abundance, not overcoming shortage.
The fullness of our fields, forests, and grazing lands is an important ad-
vantage in our struggle against World tyranny and our crusade against
poverty. Our farmers have provided us with a powerful weapon in the idea-
logical and economic struggle in which we are now engaged. Yet far too many
of our farm families, the source of this strength, have not received a fair
return for their labor.
The Democratic Party platform says:
It, the new Democratic Administration, will reaffirm the economic bill of
rights which Franklin Roosevelt wrote into the National conscience 16 years
ago: 'the right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which
will give him and his family a decent living'. We shall take positive action
to raise farm income to full parity levels and preserve family farming as a
way of life.
Since all farmers, including low-income or marginal farmers, are
used in developing the picture of disparity for agriculture, the question
arises as to how the programs developed to improve the price and income
situation in agriculture have affected low-income farmers. The remain-
der of this report deals with a description of the problem and an attempt
to analyze some of the long-run effects of price and income support
programs on farm income in the Appalachian Area, a typical low-income
farm area.
The hypothesis to be tested is that the programs which have been
developed have, in the longrun, actually worked to the disadvantage of
low-income or marginal farming areas. The analysis of this hypothesis
is approached by identifying and describing one of the major low-
income farm areas of the nation, the Appalachian Area. Next, the
extent of government aid to farmers is outlined. With this background
^"Problems and Policies of American Agriculture, Iowa State University Preiss, 1958,
p. 9. Paper by S. E. Johnson and K. L.. Dachman on "Recent Clianges in Resource Use and
Farm Incomes."
^^Problenis and Policies of American Agriculture, Iowa State University Pness. 1958.
Paper by John F. Timmons entitled "Land Institutions."
a theoretical model is developed to illustrate the effects of price and
income support programs on low-income farmers as compared with
relatively high-income farmers located in specialized farming areas.
Next, the model is tested and implications drawn in light of the em-
pirical data used to test the model. (Note: Marginal or specialized areas
or farmers are used throughout this report as a handle for relatively
high and relatively low cost producers or the disadvantaged producers
as compared to the more advantaged producers. While referring to areas
it is realized that marginal and specialized producers may be inter-
mingled, one or the other of the two terms would give a fairly good
description of the general situation in a given area.)
A Description of a Marginal Farming Area
Figure 1 shows for the United States the average value of products
sold per farm in 1954 on a county unit basis. It shows that the Appa-
lachian Area is perhaps the major, but by no means the only low farm
income area in the nation. Similar areas of varying degree and extent
are scattered throughout the nation and each state contains many in-
dividual low-income farms. The fact that in 1954, 56 per cent of the
farms provided only 9 per cent of the value of farm sales emphasizes
this situation. The low-income farm problem, although often not
recognized in policy discussions, has some significance in every state.
Professor James S. Brown of the University of Kentucky has set
rather definite bounds as to what is often referred to as the "Appalachian
Area" or "Southern Appalachians." Brown defines the area as follows:
The area called 'The Southern Appalachians' is comprised of parts of seven
Southern states. It is about 640 miles long, running from northern Alabama
in the Southwest to Pennsylvania and Maryland in the Northeast. At its
widest point, the region is about 275 miles wide. It has a land area of more
than 80,000 square miles, almost exactly the size of Minnesota. Only 13 states
cover larger land areas. In 1950, the Southern Appalachians region had a
population of 5,833,263. Only seven states had larger populations (New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, and California). In the South
only Texas had a larger land area or a larger popidation than this mountain
region.
The region includes about 27 per cent of the land area of seven Southern
states (Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia,
and West Virginia). The proportions of states included range from 8 per
cent of Alabama to 86 per cent of West Virginia (Georgia 11, North Carolina
19, Kentucky 28, Tennessee 36, Virginia 36).
The region also includes about the same percentage of the total populations
of these seven states (26.4 per cent), with the range extending from 7 per
cent in Alabama to 82 per cent in West Virginia (Georgia 10, North Carolina
14, Kentucky 27, Virginia 28, Tennessee 40).i2
^-In a speech entitled "Migration within, to and from the Southern Appalachians, 1935-
1958 : Extent, Direction and Social Effects," presented to the Association of Southern
Agricultural Workers 56th Annual Convention held in Memphis, Tennessee, February 1959.
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Both Brown's report and Figure 1 indicate that a higher proportion,
86 per cent, of the land area of West Virginia is inchided in the Appa-
lachian Area than is the case of any other state. Since most of the data,
both primary and secondary, bearing on our subject are available on
a state basis only. West Virginia data will be used as fairly representative
of the situation in the area as a whole. State-wide data for any other of
the six states touched by the Area are not nearly so representative of
the low-income farm problem because a much smaller part of their land
areas is located in the Appalachian Area. They also have large areas
in which there are relatively good commercial farms.
It is recognized that this use of West Virginia data may darken
somewhat the picture for the Appalachian Area. In spite of this, how-
ever, it should be pointed out that in 1954, 38.4 per cent of the farms
in the Tennessee Valley Region were in economic classes V and VI,
having value of sales from farms of under $2,500 per farm. The Ten-
nessee Valley Region includes 125 water-shed counties in Alabama,
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Vir-
ginia. Some of these counties fall within the Appalachian Area. The
Region covers 28 per cent of the total area of the seven states but has
30 per cent of the superior land (Class I and II) .
In discussing the record of mechanization and other technologies on
production efficiency Bachman says:
Despite the over-all gain in productivity, many of our farms, particularly our
smaller ones, have made little progress. Considerable numbers of these farms
are found in all sections of the country, but they are more numerous in the
"poor soil" areas. There is a particularly large proportion of the total number
of farms located in the Eastern Hilly and Piedmont areas, the Appalachian
and Ozark Mountain areas, the Southwestern sandy areas, and the Lake
States .13
In discussing farm size in relation to income Heady and Jensen say:
Poverty in agriculture is as much a problem of farm size as of any other single
factor. The great majority of families with low incomes live on under-sized
and inadequate units. This statement applies to the whole of the United
States agriculture . . . However these low-income farms are concentrated
especially in areas such as the Southeast Cotton region, the Appalachian and
Ouchita mountain areas, the Great Lakes cut-over region, the Southern corn-
belt, disaster areas of the Great Plains and in parts of the stony, hilly New
England soils where agriculture has declined in importance .i*
Even though the agricultural situation in the Appalachian Area may
be somewhat better than the West Virginia data would indicate, the
above quotations illustrate how widely it is held to be a low-income
farm area.
i3"Scale Changes in Farming," Kenneth L. Bachman, Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.
XXXIV, 2, p. 168. ^ ^ XT ^. , T, f
"Heady, O. E. and H. R. Jensen, Farm Management Economics, New York. Prentice
Hall, 1954, 'p. '448.
West Virginia Farm Income Situation
In 1959, the total net income per farm in West Virginia was the low-
est of any state in the nation. For the United States in this year, net in-
come per farm was ^^2,548, whereas for West Virginia it was $800.i'
Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6^^^ gi\e a picture of the high proportion of
West Virginia farms with relatively low incomes. Figure 2 shows the
percentage of all farms in the State, by counties, which in 1954 had farm
sales of $25,000 or more. Only 0.5 per cent of the farms in West Virginia
had sales of this value, whereas there were 2.5 per cent of such farms in
the United States.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of all farms in M^est Virginia, by
counties, which in 1954 had farm sales of |5,000 or more. In West Vir-
ginia, 6 per cent, but in the United States, 27 per cent of the farms had
sales of this amount.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of all farms in West Virginia, by
counties, which in 1954 had farm sales of $1,200 to $4,999. In West
Virginia, 13 per cent, but in the United States 33 per cent of the farms
had sales of this amount.
Figure 5 points up the predominance of low-income farms in the
State. Fifty-one per cent of all farms in the State in 1954 sold less than
$250 of farm products, whereas in the United States only 18 per cent
had such small sales.
Figure 6 shows the percentage of farms in West Virginia, by
counties, which in 1954 sold less than $1,200 of farm products, had
less than 100 days off-farm employment, and whose off-farm income was
less than the value of their farai sales. In 1954, 43 per cent of the farms
in West Virginia were in this category as compared with only 5 per cent
in the United States. Although this group of farmers has some income
from off-farm sources, the data indicate that they are still quite de-
pendent on agriculture for income.
Figure 7 points up the importance of income from the sales of
livestock and livestock products in the State as compared to sales from
crops; the ratio is approximately 4 to 1 respectively. Feed purchases are
important cost items to livestock farmers. Figure 8 illustrates the im-
portance of purchased feeds compared to livestock sales. On the average
for the State, $0.43 of feed was purchased for each $1.00 of livestock sales.
'^'The Farm Income Situation, USDA, AMS. FIS-179 (Supplement), August 1960^ pp.
8, 9.
"For a more complete description of the farm income situation in West Virginia see
the source of the figures : West Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 433,
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FIGURE 7. West Virginia cash receipts from farm marketing, 1955. (Compiled
from West Virginia Agricultural Statistics 1956, Federal-State Crop Reporting
Service, Clnarleston, West Virginia, January 1957, p. 66.)
Thirteen per cent of the counties had feed purcliases that exceeded the
value of livestock sales.
The data presented in these figures indicate that a high proportion
of the farms in ^\'est \'irginia have relatively lo^v sales of farm pro-
ducts; that manv lo-w-income fanners (43 per cent) receive a major
part of their total income from farming; that approximately four-fifths
of total farm sales are accounted for from the sale of livestock and live-
stock products; and that feed costs are a major expense item. It ^vould
seem reasonable to assume that the situation of the low-income farmer
in West \'irginia is fairlv accurate for the Appalachian Area as defined






























Historical Background of Farm Programs
Designed to Improve Prices and Incomes
Since 1929, price supports and acreage allotments have been major
elements in our farm programs. The direct goals of these programs
have been to stabilize prices and to raise farm income. The United
States Department of Agriculture classifies its farm programs into six
groups according to their objective, of which price and income pro-
grams are one.^'
1. Programs primarily to reduce fluctuation of farm prices and
income.
2. Programs to furnish credit-backing to farmers and farm organ-
izations.
3. Programs to conserve natural resources.
4. Programs to improve farming through better education and
research.
5. Programs designed for war time, for defense, and for other needs.
6. Other: chiefly school-lunch programs, marketing services, regu-
lators', crop and animal disease, and pest control.
This study is concerned with the first group, which will be referred
to as "group one programs." It is by far the most important from the
standpoint of expenditures, accounting for 51.9 per cent of the total
realized cost for all farm programs during the period 1932-59.^® Group
one progiams have become even more important in recent years, ac-
counting for more than 57 per cent of the total costs for all progiams
in 1959.
Table 1 gives the realized cost of group one programs for the period
1932-59. The cost of farai price and income programs has fluctuated
considerably over the period with the bulk of the expenditure occurring
in recent years. The six basic commodities accounted for a major part
of the expenditure of farm price and income programs, 64.5 per cent
during the 1932-59 period. Wheat, corn, and cotton are the major com-
modities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) as ot
October 31, 1959.^^ These three commodities accounted for more than
84 per cent of a total CCC inventory of more than $7^ billion. Along
with wheat, corn, and cotton, tobacco is one of the major commodities
on which the CCC has loans. CCC operations have accounted for more
'^''Explanatory Comments on Statement of Realized Cost of Agricultural and Related
Programs, hy Function or Purpose, Fiscal Years 1932-1959, U. S. Department of Agriculture
(December 1859).
''Hhid.
'"Mimeographed report by U. S. Department of Agriculture dated December 8, 1959.
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Table 1. Realized Cost of Federal Programs Primarily for Stabilization





1932 298.2 1946 2.0
1933 75.5 1947 88.5+
1934 48.4+ 1948 118.6
1935 177.4 1949 328.4
1936 470.1 1950 458.4
1937 442.4 1951 509.3
1938 228.2 1952 288.6
1939 589.4 1953 312.5
1940 738.8 1954 785.0
1941 754.7 1955 902.0
1942 619.1 1956 1461.2
1943 497.2 1957 2714.3
1944 383.0 1958 2665.2**
1945 47.0 1959 2027.9**
TOTAL 18031.3
+Excess of Credits—Deduct.
*Explanatory Comjnents on Statement of Realized Cost of Agricultural and Related
Programs, by Functioti or Purpose, Fiscal Years 1932-1959, U. S. Department of Agriculture
(December 1959).
**The Federal Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1960. Executive Office of the President,
Bureau of the Budget, January 1959, p. 56. (1959 is an estimate.)
than 34.8 per cent of total costs o£ group one programs during the
period 1932-59, and in 1959 they accounted for more than 42 per cent.
For comparative purposes, the following states were selected as special-
ized states producing these four commodities: Iowa—corn; Kansas-
wheat; Texas—cotton; Kentucky—tobacco; and West Virginia as rep-
resenting a marginal farming area. Table 2 shows the cumulative total
CCC loans made by the selected states 1933-58.
Table 3 shows the extent to which West Virginia farmers have
participated in the price support programs for corn and wheat for the
period 1954-1957.
Although data were not available on the number of farmers par-
ticipating, the proportions of the total amount of tobacco (handled by
West Virginia tobacco markets) which were placed under the support
program are shown in Table 4.
Although some out-of-state tobacco is included in the figures in
Table 4 and some West Virginia tobacco was marketed through markets
in other states, these figures give an idea of the percentage of West
Virginia tobacco production which received price-support for the years
shown.
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Table 2. Commodity Credit Corporation: Loans by Selected States
Cumulative 1933-1958*
Cumulative Loans Per Cent of Total
state Thousands of
Dollars
Per Cent of Total
























*Source: Agricultural Statistics, 1959, U. S. Department of Agriculture, pp. 538-539.
Table 3. Corn and Wheat: Number of Farmers Participating and
Extent of CCC Support, West Virginia, 1954-1957*
Year
Number Participating Bushels Receiving Support





















* State Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Office, Morgantown, West Virginia.
Table 4. Tobacco: Total Pounds Supported in Huntington Market and
Proportion of all Tobacco Handled in this Market,















1954 3,407 1,244,666 15.1
1955 4,312 1,062,216 16.7
1956 4.305 43,191 .7
1957 3,670 283,401 3.8
*State Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Office, Morgantown, West Virginia.
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Corn and wheat are important as inputs to West Virginia farmers.
West Virginia farmers purchase, in feeds, approximately 80 per cent as
much corn as they produce and approximately 120 per cent as much
wheat as they produce. On the other hand, State farmers place ap-
proximately 1 per cent of their production of corn and wheat under the
price-support programs. In 1956, approximately 3 per cent of the
farmers in West Virginia sold wheat and approximately 7 per cent sold
corn, while 86 per cent bought feeds, exclusive of roughage.
Since less than 4 per cent of the cash receipts to farmers in West
Virginia are from the sale of basic commodities (Figure 7) and since
approximately 40 per cent of the cash receipts in the specialist states
are from one commodity or related to one commodity. Tables 2 and 3
confirm that which would be expected; namely, that marginal areas
receive relatively little direct aid from price and income programs.
This then raises the question as to how price and income programs
through long-term adjustments have affected farm incomes in the
Appalachian Area. The remainder of this report is directed toward an
answer to this question.
Theoretical Model
In terms of equilibrium theory, any change would set into oper-
ation certain economic forces which move in the direction of a new
equilibrium position. The purpose of this section is to illustrate theo-
retically how progiams designed to support and stabilize farm prices and
income would be expected to affect farm income in marginal areas as
compared to specialized areas through long-run adjustments. In the
long run, the effects would be expected to become apparent through
changes in the relative comparative advantage of the two areas; marginal
and specialized. To begin with, the Appalachian Area (a marginal area)
would be at a comparative disadvantage in the production of most farm
products. Is this comparative disadvantage lessened or increased due to
farm price and income programs?
Such programs tend to stabilize and support farm prices at higher
levels. Stabilized and higher prices are signals to farm operators to
adopt improved methods and new technology. The adoption of im-
proved methods and new technology tend to:
1. Increase total output and reduce costs per unit of output.
2. Increase the use of capital and decrease the use of labor.
3. Cause more specialization both by areas and individuals.
4. Increase the size of production units.
21
Marginal areas are usually unable to adopt improved methods and
new technology or they adopt them at a much slower rate than do
specialized areas. The rapid adoption of improved methods and new
technology by specialized areas tends to expand output faster than de-
mand is expanding, therefore, there would be a downward pressure on
farm prices. This downward pressure would catch the non-adopter in a
tighter cost-price squeeze than the adopter. Consequently, marginal
areas would be at a greater disadvantage than before the programs were
initiated. Figure 9 illustrates this graphically.
Assume that SS^ S- is the supply curve for agricultural products.
Also assume that DD is the demand for agricultural products and re-
mains constant and perfectly inelastic during the period under con-
sideration. Now assume that those products representing SS^ or the low
cost 90 per cent of the supply being taken, adopt improved methods of
production which reduces their costs and increases their output as rep-
resented by Sg S^. In order to construct the new supply curve, the S^ S-
section of the original supply curve must be shifted to the right and the
new supply curve now becomes S"* S^ S.. Now the producers that were
originally producing 90 per cent of the supply or SS^ are producing
enough for the market and willing to supply it at a price of P,. There-
fore, the price has moved lower than the cost of production of the
Quantity
FIGURE 9. Hypothetical situation illustrating rapid technological change.
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tion
producers represented by the S^ S-' section of the supply curve. Con-
sequently, strong pressures have been created to force them to shift out
of production. This appears to be what has happened to the marginal
producers in the Appalachian Area.
There appears to be ample evidence that price and income pro-
grams have both stabilized and supported prices. To cite an example,
Shepherd and Richards say:
Our own over-all conclusion, based on the USDA studies and on our own
analysis, is that in most years the withholding of the CCC stocks of corn
from the market had a substantial supporting effect on corn prices, but that
the effect in recent years was not as great as if corn had been consumed and
removed entirely from the market. For feed grains as a whole, however, the
effect of the withholding of the CCC stocks of feed grains appears to be as
great as if the CCC stocks were removed entirely from the market.20
Although the evidence indicates that farm price and income pro-
grams stabilize and support prices, the effect of more stable and higher
prices on the adoption of new technologies must be established primarily
on the basis of logic.
Cochrane presents the general framework in the following quota-
. . . price fluctuations create uncertainties in the minds of producers and thus
interfere with long-run production planning. I take it to be the case that the
greater the price fluctuations, the greater the uncertainty, and the more re-
luctant the farmer is to make the additional cash outlays associated with in-
creased capital inpuLs or the adoption of new technologies. The more stable
the prices, assuming they are high enough to hold the farmer in production,
the more sure he is of the future and the more willing he is to make the
cash outlays associated with new techniques. Thus given the technologies
and the average level of prices, I would expect to find the rate of techno-
logical advance more rapid with stable prices than variable prices. Further,
I am inclined to guess that the efficiency implications to the economy of
variable rates of technological advance are of greater importance than the
static problem of variable proportions.
But the question arises—What evidence is there to support the above state-
ments? I would offer two types. The first consists of an appeal to personal
experience. I know that I would be more inclined to borrow funds and
sink my savings in improved techniques to expand production where I was
certain of the future than where I wasn't (assuming, of course, that the
certain future is a happy one). Second, in the work we have been doing at
Minnesota concerned with the impact of government programs on the potato
industry w^e have observed the following: (1) the deflated price of potatoes
averaged almost the same in the two periods 1934-41 and 1942-50, but (2)
production jumped from an average of 369 million bushels per year in the
first period to an average of 430 million bushels in the second. And this in-
crease in output cannot be explained in terms of increased inputs of land
and labor; both decreased in the second period.
-"Geoffrey Shepherd and Allen Richards, '-Effects of the Federal Progrcuiis for Corn
and Other Giriiiis on Corn Prices, Feed Grains Production and Livestock Production," North
Central Regional Publication No. 89, Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment
Station Research Bulletin 459, Iowa State College, August 1958, p. 276.
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We think it is to be explained in terms of increased specialization involving
increased capital inputs and new methods. And this in turn was induced
bv a reduction in year-to-year price fluctuation from 39 per cent in the first
period to 11 per cent in the second. In short, we say that the important
supply response in potatoes during the support period 1942-50 cannot be
explained in terms of a relative price change, but it can be explained in
terms of elimination of price risk which resulted from the price stability
provided by price supports.21
It is not meant to infer that price-support programs are the only
stimulant to the adoption of new technolog)', however, such programs
do appear to be a very important factor. For example, relatively high
market prices w^ould also be such a stimulant. It is argued, however,
that government supported prices at the same level as free market prices
are much more of a stimulant to the adoption of new technology than
are free market prices because of less price risk. Support programs
established a floor for prices and removed much of the risk of lower
prices. Figure 10 presents a graphic picture of prices received by farmers
and the realized costs of price and income programs. These data illus-
trate how the two supplement each other. For example, as the prices
received by farmers decline, the expenditures for programs to support
prices increase. Support programs may play an important part even
though expenditures are low because they provide a floor or remove the
risk of extremely low prices. This was the case during the late forties.
As soon as prices received start down, however, program expenditures
increase. This was the case in 1939, 1949, and again since 1953. There-
fore, the data would indicate that price support programs have con-
tributed to conditions which encourage farmers to adopt new tech-
nology where possible and feasible. Next we shall see if fanners did
in fact make such adoptions.
Analysis of the Adoption of New Methods
One measure of the rate of adoption of new technology is the num-
ber of persons supported per farm worker. Table 5 shows this number in
the United States at various points of time from 1820 to 1957. During
this period the number of persons supported per farm worker increased
from 4.12 to 23.55. This increase is equally divided between two periods:
from 1820 to 1944 there was an increase of 9.72 persons, and between
1944 and 1957 there was an almost identical increase of 9.71 persons.
In other words, w^hen farm labor efficiency is measured in these terms,
it increased as much during the last 13 years as it did during all of the
first 124 years of the period.
^Journal of Farm Economics, Tbe American Farm Economic Association, Vol. XXXV,
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FIGURE 10. Prices received by farmers, realized cost of programs primarily
to stabilize farm prices and income, 1932-59. (Source: United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture.)
It is during this recent 13-year period that price-support programs
have played their most important role. (The role has continued to
be even inore important in more recent years, but most of our data
end with 1957.) More than 77 per cent of the total realized cost of
the group one programs during the 1932-59 period was incurred between
1944 and 1959, a 15-year period. During the early part of this period,
prices received by farmers were relatively high, and even though the
expenditures incurred on these programs were small, the fact remains
that the price-support programs were in effect. The mere fact that the
price-support programs were available removed the risk of lower prices.
West Virginia has lagged behind the rest of the country in the
adoption of new technology and increasing the efficiency of labor. The
data in Table 6 give a clue as to the degree to which West Virginia is
lagging behind in the adoption of technology. Usually, about three
times as much labor is needed to harvest corn from the shock as to
harvest by hand from the standing stalk, and about six times as much as
to harvest with mechanical pickers. While 98 per cent of the corn for grain
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Table 5. Persons Supported by Producfion of One Farm Worker,
United States, 1820-1957

































* Includes the farm worker.
Source : Changes in Farm Production and Efficiency, A Sumtnary Report, U. S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture Statistical Bulletin No. 233, Washington, D. C, August 1958.
in Iowa and 78 per cent in the United States was harvested with a corn
picker, only 39 per cent was so harvested in West Virginia in 1956.
In the same year, West Virginia shocked 40 per cent o£ the corn harvested
for grain, whereas Iowa shocked less than one-half of 1 per cent, and the
average for the United States was only 2 per cent.
The data in Table 7 further emphasize the degree to which West
Virginia has fallen behind in the adoption of labor-saving methods
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Table 6. Corn for Grain: Percentage Harvested by Methods in West
Virginia, Iowa, and the United States for Specified Years
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*Less than 0.5 per cent.
Source : Harvesting the 1
D. C, April 1959.
956 Corn C op, ARS 43 -91, USDA, ARS, AMS. Washington,
compared to the United States and selected specialized states in the pro-
duction of corn, wheat, and tobacco. In 1950, West Virginia labor re-
quirements per unit of output for each of the three crops were ap-
proximately the same as those of the United States in 1910-1914.
By 1950, the labor requirements for producing corn in West Vir-
ginia had decreased to 79 per cent of what they were in 1939, but in
Jowa, an area of specialized production, they had dropped to 57 per cent.
By 1950, the labor reqturements for producing wheat in West Vir-
ginia were 73 per cent of what they were in 1939, but in North Dakota,
a Avheat-growing state, they had dropped to 44 per cent. By 1950, the
labor requirements in "W'est Virginia for producing tobacco were 143
per cent of what they were in 1939, but in Kentucky, with its specialized
tobacco areas, the requirements remained the same per unit of output.
On the basis of general information and in the absence of exact data,
we must conclude that these disparities in labor requirements have in-
creased in the recent years, since 1950, at an even more rapid rate.
Figure 1 1 shows that West Virginia increased its use of fertilizer
at about the same rate as the United States from 1929 until about 1950.
Since 1950 the use of fertilizer in the United States has continued to
increase, while in West Virginia it has tended to decline \ery rapidly.
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Table 7. Labor Used Per Unit of Output for Corn, Wheat, and




Man-hours per 100 bushels 135 112 34
Index 100 83 25
Wheat —
Man-hours per 100 bushels 106 67 26
Index 100 63 25
Tobacco —
Man-hours per 100 pounds 44 47 37
Index 100 107 84
West Virginia Specialized State
1939 1950 1939 1950
Corn — Iowa
Man-hours per 100 bushels 165 131 32 18
Index 100 79 100 56
Wheat — North Dakota
Man-hours per 100 bushels 153 111 62 27
Index 100 73 100 44
Tobacco — Kentucky
Man-hours per 100 pounds 37 53 33 33
Index 100 143 100 100
Source: LaTjor Used for Field Crops, Statistical Bulletin No. 144, ARS, USDA, Wash-
ington, D. C, June 1954.
Johnson and Bachman estimate the importance of fertilizer in increas-
ing farm output in the following quotation: "Increased use of com-
mercial fertilizer has made the greatest contribution to higher crop
yields in the last 15 years. Probably it accounted for more than half of
the increase in crop production per acre."-- They estimate that nearly
half of the increase in output has come from higher crop production
per acre.
The use of limestone in West Virginia has been reduced rapidly
since the early forties, whereas in the United States it has continued to
increase. For example, in 1958 West Virginia used only 31 per cent on
the limestone it used in 1944, and the United States used 189 per cent^
of what it used in 1944.--^
The impact of the relative rates of adoption of new technology is
reflected in net income. During periods of rapid technological develop-
ment, net income to M^est Virginia farmers falls behind that of the
--Farm Policy Forum, Volume 11, No. 3, 1958-59, p. 9.
"''Source : National Agricultural Limestone Institute, Inc., Washington, D. C.
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FIGURE 11. Index of fertilizer used in United States and West Virginia, 1929-
1956. (Source: Agricultural Statistics.)
specialized farm states and the United States average. The data in Table
8 show that from 1929 to 1940 net farm income for West Virginia, the
United States, and certain specialized states moved along together. For
example, on an index basis starting with 1929 as equal to 100, in 1940
the United States, M^est Virginia, and Texas all had an index of be-
tween 76 and 77; Kansas and Kentucky were slightly lower, between 67
and 68; Iowa was higher with an index of 92.5. During this period,
1930-1940, the average annual increase in output per farm worker was
less than 1 per cent per year (Table 5) . During the period 1940-1957,
net farm income for the United States and the selected specialized states
pulled away from that of West Virginia. For example, in 1957 the
index of net farm income for West Virginia was still below 100—96.4, in
the United States it was 194.3, Kansas 133.9, Kentucky 150, Texas 159,
and Iowa 286.5. It was during this period, 1940-1957, that the average
annual increase in output per worker was more than 7 per cent per year
(Table 5) . It was also during this period that farm prices were either
relatively high or expenditures on group one programs were high
(Figure 10). For example, more than 90 per cent of the total realized
cost of group one programs occurred since 1940 (Table 1) .
From 1910-1940 the index of farm value of corn and wheat in West
Virginia moved along at about the same level as that for the United
States. Indices for both M'est Virginia and the United States in 1940
were approximately what they were in 1910, or 100 (Figures 12 and 13).
Since 1940, however, the indices of the farm value of corn and wheat
for the United States have pulled away from those for West Virginia.
For example, in 1959, the indices of the United States were: corn—317
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Table 8. Index of Net Farm Income for the United States and






Iowa Texas Kansas Kentucky
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100
1930 69.2 64.3 72.0 62.1 78.2 53.1
1931 52.8 85.7 32.0 48.2 60.3 68.8
1932 32.4 48.2 23.1 34.4 6.3 36.2
1933 40.8 66.1 17.3 47.8 20.1 39.3
1934 41.0 53.6 3.7 45.8 19.5 40.8
1935 84.4 84.0 96.3 70.5 77.0 62.8
1936 66.2 73.2 38.6 57.3 55.7 55.6
1937 94.1 98.2 119.9 83.3 82.2 108.7
1938 72.6 78.6 82.4 62.8 55.8 70.4
1939 72.3 82.1 80.7 68.7 49.4 65.8
1940 76.5 76.8 92.5 76.0 67.8 67.3
1941 109.0 92.9 117.6 97.4 106.3 82.7
1942 167.7 119.6 208.6 137.2 202.3 126.0
1943 190.4 139.3 230.5 171.1 208.6 151.5
1944 193.1 128.6 175.2 170.0 241.4 164.3
1945 198.1 155.4 186.5 135.7 217.2 174.0
1946 233.6 171.4 271.2 164.8 250.0 198.0
1947 242.7 169.6 217.0 245.4 405.7 188.7
1948 280.5 191.1 414.0 196.3 305.7 227.6
1949 216.6 157.7 210.1 270.2 228.2 190.0
1950 234.6 142.0 307.7 211.2 286.9 163.5
1951 273.7 177.0 298.0 245.6 237.5 210.2
1952 257.0 163.4 322.0 204.7 316.3 187.4
1953 222.5 126.1 238.9 165.7 154.1 169.9
1954 212.7 139.6 312.3 173.6 215.1 181.4
1955 197.2 109.8 176.1 158.0 119.7 153.0
1956 194.7 103.7 197.6 127.4 115.4 175.1
1957 197.4 85.7 290.3 158.4 133.0 146.3
1958 234.9 108.0 280.1 228.0 293.3 177.8
1959 198.2 89.3 208.8 197.6 191.8 156.4
''Source: U. S. Department of Commerce and USDA.
and wheat—347, while for West Virginia they were corn—95.6 and wheat
38.1 (Figures 12 and 13) . Tobacco has followed somewhat the same
pattern; in 1959 the index of farm value for the United States was 984
and West Virginia 176, with the bulk of the spread taking place since
1940 (Figure 14) .
Data indicate that an extremely small part of the cost of price and
income programs are expended on marginal farins, while the specialized
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FIGURE 12. Corn: Indices of farm value in West Virginia and United States,
1910-1959. (Data from Agricultural Statistics, United States Department of
Agriculture, issued as follows: 1952, pp. 35-36; 1956, p. 27; and West Virginia
Agricultural Statistics, Federal-State Crop Reporting Service, issued as follows:
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FIGURE 13, Wheat: Indices of farm value in West Virginia and United States,
1910-59. (Data from Agricultural Statistics, United States Department of
Agriculture, issued as follows: 1952, pp. 1-2; 1956, p. 1; and West Virginia
Agricultural Statistics, Federal-State Crop Reporting Service, issued as fol-
lows: 1943, pp. 35-36; 1951, p. 28, 1956, p. 39, December 1959.)
received one-half of one hundredth of 1 per cent of the cuniidative cost
of CCC loans for the United States from 1933-1957 (Table 2) ; Ken-
tucky accounted for 1.87, Kansas 7.72, Iowa 7.32, and Texas 13.64 per
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FIGURE 14. Tobacco: Indices of farm value in West Virginia and United
States, 1910-1959. (Data from Agricultural Statistics, United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, issued as follows: 1952, pp. 126-127; 1956, p. 95; and West
Virginia Agricultural Statistics, Federal-State Crop Reporting Service, issued
as follows: 1943, pp. 39-40; 1951, p. 32; 1956, p. 36, December 1959.)
are concentrated in the hands of a relatively few specialized producers.
The bulk of total farm sales are also concentrated in the hands of rela-
tively large producers. In 1954, 44 per cent of the farms in the nation
accounted for 91 per cent of the value of sales, while 56 per cent of the
farms accounted for 9 per cent of sales.-*
The bulk of the evidence presented would tend to support the
validity of the hypothetical model presented; that is, that specialized
areas and farmers produce most of our farm products (44 per cent pro-
duce 91 per cent) ; that virtually all of the expenditures on price and
income support programs have been expended in the specialized areas;
that farmers in the specialized areas have made rapid adoption of new
technology since 1944, during which time farm prices were either rela-
tively good or program expenditures were relatively high; marginal
farmers either have not or have at a relatively slow rate adopted new
technologies; that expanded production by the specialized farmers has
tended to cause farm prices to move downward; and, finally, that
marginal farmers are at a greater disadvantage relative to specialized
farmers than they were before the programs were developed.






























FIGURE 15. Basic crop allotment data. (Source: Statement by Secretary of
Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson before the House Committee on Agriculture,
July 9, 1959.)
Implications and Conclusions
In 1959 farm price support and related programs cost in excess o£
$2 billion. Indications are that the direct effects of price and income
support programs accrue mostly to the 44 per cent of the nation's farms
whose products account for more than 91 per cent of the value of all
farm sales. It is obvious that the 56 per cent of the nation's farmers
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accounting for only 9 per cent of the total farm sales receive little direct
help from such programs because these farmers market fami products
in very small quantities and it is in the market place where most of the
support programs are put into effect.
The evidence would indicate that price and income support pro-
grams have contributed to the rapid adoption of new technolog)' in
specialized areas in recent years. Marginal areas either have not adopted
new technology or have adopted it at a relatively slow rate.
It would appear that price and income programs have encouraged
the shifting of production from marginal areas to the specialized areas.
For example, Shepherd and Richards-' found that as a result of all
influences corn acreage and production are in fact becoming somewhat
more rather than less centralized in the heart of the Corn Beit.
Cochrane et al. found that potato programs were instrumental in.
accelerating movement toward more efficient production.-*^ The shift in
production from marginal areas to more specialized areas Avould in-
crease the efficiency of production and would force marginal areas out
of production, thereby reducing their income until alternatives are de-
veloped. Mackie and Baum came to similar conclusions as far as the
adoption of new technology is concerned.
These farmers (the 'have-nots'—or low income farmers) lack adequate capital,
land resources, and possible education to take advantage of the latest tech-
nical knowledge and innovations. So adjustments made by successful farmers
appear to be impossible to this group. Thus, the recent technological revolu-
tion in agriculture has not only bypassed the 'have-not' farm people-
it has left them relatively worse off.27
It is the innovator and early adopter who profits, while the late
adopter and non-adopter would be relatively more inefficient and rela-
tively worse-off than before the new technology was introduced.
From the standpoint of welfare of society as a whole such shifts
should be desirable. However, to the extent that low-income farmers are
used as justification for price and income support programs and to the
extent that the programs developed actually work to their disadvantage
the programs have been disillusions.
The second phase of this study will examine in detail the direct
effects of programs on the Appalachian Area farmers and it will also
offer alternative programs for these farmers. The optiinum allocation
of the resources of the Appalachian Area farmer will require major re-
organization and adjustment of farm resources and the inoveraent of
^"Shepherd and Richards, op. cit., p. 285.
^R. W. Gray, V. L. Sorenson, and Willard W. Cochrane, An Economic Analysis of the
Iinpact of Govei-nment Programs on the Potato Industry of the United States, University of
Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station Technical Bulletin 211, North Central Regional
Publication No. 42, December 1953, p. 145.
^''Farm Policy Forum^ op. cit,, p. 31.
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some of the human resources to non-farm employment. Rural Develop-
ment Progiam is directed more toward these adjustments than the price
and income support program.
I
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